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Throughout the 1990s, government reports such as the Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting Report (Industry Commission1996) and the Report of the Independent 
Commission to Review Public Sector Finances (McCarrey 1993), suggested that the 
contracting-out of government services would improve the delivery of public goods in 
Australia. This article reports on the findings of a case study of contracting-out of building 
maintenance services in the state of Western Australia in Australia. The study focuses on 
evaluating the impact of the contracting-out of these services on the wages and conditions 
of employees affected by moving from public sector to private sector employment. 
The study found differences in the employment conditions of white collar and 
blue collar workers. In general, the conditions of white collar workers improved but 
there was a marginal decline in the conditions of blue collar workers. The article concludes 
that while contracting-out created budgetary savings for government, these resulted 
partly from a reduction in wages and benefits of former blue collar staff, despite 
the best efforts of the Western Australian government to protect staff wages and 
benefits. The research makes an important theoretical contribution by arguing that the 
impact of contracting-out on staff wages, benefits and conditions is conditional upon 
the level of competition in the labor market for worker’s expertise. In “thick markets”, 
wages, benefits and conditions are likely to reduce, due to strong competition for expertise. 
However in “thin markets”, wages, benefits and conditions are likely to increase, 
due to weak competition for expertise (Borland, 1994). 
 
Introduction 
Contracting-out of government services has fundamentally changed the nature of service 
delivery for government agencies (Verspaandonk 2001). Proponents have argued 
that the contracting-out of government services will result in considerable cost savings 
to government, due to the market efficiencies of a competitive tendering system 
(Domberger 1994). Concerns have been raised, however, with the effectiveness and 
efficiency of contracting-out government services, as well as concerns about competition 
and quality (Prager 1994). Quiggin (1999) has also raised concerns about the redistribution 
of risk from government to private sectors, and the source of any efficiency 
gained, arguing that these cost savings are most likely to ensue from reductions 
in staff wages and benefits. 
 
This article will extend the research into the contracting-out of government services 
by examining the effect of the policy of contracting-out of building maintenance 
services in Western Australia. Evaluation of both the intended and actual outcomes of 
the policy outcomes are a critical part of this process (Department of Finance 1994:8). 
When undertaking evaluating a government policy or regulation, good practice includes 
an assessment of the impacts of the policy, in terms of its direct and indirect 
costs on government, business and the community, as well as the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of the policy (Productivity Commission 2004; Regulatory Impact 
Statement Guidelines 1995). 
 
This research project follows this approach when evaluating the effect of contracting- 
out policy in Western Australia, by firstly establishing the intended outcomes 
of contracting-out by reviewing main elements of the academic literature and government 
reports that guided the implementation of the policy. A specific research question 
will be developed from the academic literature concerning contracting-out, together 
with a methodology for undertaking the research. This research question will 
then be examined based on the actual outcomes of the contracting-out process of 
maintenance workers in Western Australia. While efficiency gains will be noted, the 
focus will be on the impact of contracting-out policy on employee wages and benefits 
– the economic and social costs of the policy. The specific case of contracting-out in 
Western Australia will then be explored in order to determine the intended and actual 
industrial relations outcomes, for government employees of the contracting-out process. 
The article finds that staff wages and benefits were negatively affected following 
the contracting-out of maintenance services, however, the position of white collar 
workers improved through obtaining better jobs in transitioning to the contracted environment. 
 
The conclusion drawn from the research is that white collar workers in 
“thin” labor market sectors are better able to position themselves for new types of 
jobs in the contracting-out regime. 
 
An Overview of Contracting-Out in Australia 
In examining the effects of contracting-out of government services in Australia, the 
Industry Commission (1996) predicted benefits of an expansion of contracting-out 
throughout Australia would be an increase in GDP of between 0.3% and 1.7%. The 
Industry Commission (1996) made broad recommendations in relation to the imple mentation of 
competitive tendering and contracting-out policies. These recommendations 
covered issues such as accountability, quality, industry development issues, the 
evaluation and tendering for contracts, local government provision of service and employment 
effects. Contracting-out is determined to occur when: 
a government or public agency ceases to provide a specific activity or service through directly 
employing its own staff and instead purchases that service or activity from a private 
corporation or non-government agency (Paddon/Thanki 1995). 
 
The use of contracting-out and competitive tendering was advocated as a means by 
which government agencies can deliver more client-focused services while achieving 
savings and maintaining accountability (Australian Public Service Commission [APSC] 
2003). Figure 1 depicts the increase in the value of services that have been contracted 
out in Australia since 1999. 
 
 
Graphics derived from Statistics on Commonwealth Contract Notifications 1999-2004. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the number of services contracted-out since 1999. It can be seen 
from this data that the number of contracts has increased progressively over the past 
five years. 
 
Government statistics demonstrate a steady increase in both the value and the number 
of government services contracted-out since 1999. Borland (1994) is concerned that 
this push to implement contracting-out may be as a result of it being the latest fad or 
fashion, rather than as a result of careful planning and research. Nevertheless, contracting- 
out of government services has grown steadily in Australia, and remains a key 
policy of government. 
 
The potential benefits from contracting-out are argued to include lower costs, 
improved service delivery and quality, and greater flexibility (King 1994). Competition 
between potential bidders for government contracts creates incentives to minimize 
costs, or to develop innovative products and services, which provide a commercial 
edge in the marketplace (Rimmer 1994:1). Steane and Walker (2000) note that contracting- 
out has generally delivered cost savings to government, although results vary 
depending on what is contracted-out, and how the contracting-out process is managed. 
 
The Industry Commission (1996) likewise found that savings could be achieved 
by government in the contracting-out of services, in most circumstances. 
Domberger (1994) considered the trend towards the contracting-out of government 
services as a key aspect of public sector reform. Based on case studies from a 
wide range of countries and services, Domberger et al. (1995a) calculated that the average 
savings obtainable from contracting-out would be around 20%. Domberger et 
al. (1995a) also suggested that efficiency gains could be obtained by removing control 
from protected in-house producers to encourage a competitive environment with 
both public and private sector providers bidding on public contracts. These results, 
however, have been criticized for potentially not considering all costs involved (Quiggin 
1996, 2002), and for using measures and statistical tools unsuited for the task for 
which they were implemented (Paddon/Thanki 1995: 28–29). 
While the net fiscal result of contracting-out is generally argued as being positive 
for governments, the basis of those savings has been questioned by some researchers. 
 
While in theory contracting-out appears to offer a Pareto improvement – a way to 
make some people better off without harming anybody else – in reality contractingout 
can leave some parties worse off (King 1994; Rimmer 1994). Quiggin (1994) argued 
that the cost savings deriving from contracting-out are due to a reduction in 
wages and benefits for workers, or an increase in work intensity. Lafferty and Roan 
(2000) also argue that the contracting-out of government services affects the skills and 
training of staff by reducing access to training, consequently resulting in a net loss of 
industry specific skills. 
 
The benefits and problems associated with the contracting-out of government 
services extends into areas such as the cost, service quality, contract management, regional 
development and risk, together with a reduction in wages and benefits for workers. 
As noted above, this article will focus on the issue of salary and employment 
conditions of staff to specifically test Quiggin's (1994) contention that budgetary savings 
from contracting-out are likely to be the result of a reduction in staff wages and 
benefits, and an increase in work intensity. While Quiggin (1994) also contends that 
tax avoidance is a possible outcome of contracting-out policy, the researchers considered 
it unlikely that sufficient data would be forthcoming from interviews to be able 
to properly validate this aspect of Quiggin’s theory. Academic literature would there fore suggest that 
the policy of contracting-out could be expected to have a negative 
economic impact for former employees, but would be positive economic outcome for 
government. 
 
The research on contracting and employment conditions 
Employee benefits and salary are contentious issues in contracted arrangements. 
Domberger (1994) contends that gains from contracting-out are mostly from improvements 
in efficiency and only minor cost-benefits are achieved through job 
losses, lower wages and reduced benefits. However, Quiggin (1996) predicts that reductions 
in wages and benefits would be a significant source of cost saving. This aspect 
is a key debate in the academic literature. This divergence of opinion by academics 
has sparked a lively interest in determining the actual source of savings in contracting- 
out, and is a key driver for this research. 
 
While widespread redundancy of public employees is sometimes used in conjunction 
with contracting-out, this is not always simply a case of net job losses. Domberger 
(1994) notes that public sector redundancies are matched, in part, by increases in 
private sector employment, especially in small to medium enterprises. The Industry 
Commission (1996) likewise found in a range of contracting-out cases that considerable 
numbers of public employees had successfully been reassigned or found work 
with contractors. 
 
Domberger et al. (1995a) maintain that public sector employees may not be as efficient 
as their private sector counterparts and suggest this could be a major driver behind 
contracting-out by the public sector. Quiggin (1996) criticizes the use of contracting- 
out as a means to increase work intensity, as it is argued that the increased 
productivity gains from the increased effort of workers is a free good. Increasing the 
working hours or working intensity of workers is not a costless method of increasing 
output, as it is the workers themselves who are paying the cost of the increased efficiency. 
 
In their study of electrical generation employees and union actions, Teicher et al. 
(2000) found that contracting-out is sometimes used to decrease union control, and 
can provide the mechanism for maneuvering around basic award benefits, working 
conditions and unfair dismissal laws. The issue of the relative efficiencies of a unionized 
workforce versus a non-unionized workforce has not been a strong focus in the 
literature to date, although Domberger et al. (1995a) argue that public service employees 
are less efficient than their private counterparts. Teicher et al. (2000) also notes a 
trend away from providing training to employees in contracts. Lafferty and Roan 
(2000) considered the effects of less training and the lack of skills in the workforce, 
finding that there was a loss of industry-specific skills in administrative staff and that 
training was rarely provided by either the contractor of the agency hiring the staff. 
Lafferty and Roan (2000) also suggest that women receive less training than men, based 
on the type of work commonly being outsourced. 
Similar to those issues mentioned by Lafferty and Roan (2000), training and gender 
effects are also explored in detail by the Industry Commission (1996) who found 
that there might be a range of equal employment opportunity [EEO] provisions that 
need to be addressed with the contracting-out of government services. The Industry 
 
Commission (1996) received submissions from many sources suggesting that women, 
people from non-English speaking backgrounds and older employees found it harder 
to find jobs in the private sector compared to more advantaged groups. 
 
While contracting-out is argued to result in cost-efficiencies, some authors contend 
that these efficiencies are gained through the reduction in pay, benefits, and 
training for employees, or an increase in work intensity. Changing work practices that 
can occur as a result of the contracting-out of government services has not been 
strongly featured in the literature to date, apart from general notions of efficiency. 
More research is needed before strong conclusions can be made about the impact of 
contracting-out on costs in Australia (Rimmer 1994). 
 
Research Question 
Contracting-out has been widely implemented in Australia and is argued to achieve 
significant efficiencies due to the efficiencies wrought by competition (Domberger et 
al. 1995a). Some authors have claimed that the source of these efficiencies could be at 
least partly attributed to reduced wages and benefits of staff, and increased work intensity 
(Quiggin 1994). This article seeks to explore this difference by examining the 
impact of contracting-out in a specific case study: maintenance workers in Western 
Australia. A suitable research question would therefore be: 
What effect did the contracting-out of maintenance workers in Western Australia 
have upon employee wages, benefits, and conditions? 
 
Research methods 
This article examines the contracting-out of building maintenance services by the 
Western Australia Building Maintenance Authority [WABMA], in Australia. Case studies 
involve the systematic and in-depth analysis of information on a particular “case” – 
individual, group, organization, or community and utilizes a variety of data gathering 
methods (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran 2000: 112). Case studies are useful for testing 
theories in a real life setting in order to confirm, challenge or expand a theory (Yin 
2003). Yin (2003: 40) argues particularly that the “case can then be utilized to determine 
whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of 
explanations might be more relevant”. Since the goal of this research is to specifically 
explore the theoretical assertion of Quiggin (1994) noted above, that contracting-out 
is likely to result in the reduction of staff wages and benefits, and increased work intensity, 
then a case study method would be an appropriate methodology. 
 
The unit of analysis of this particular case study will be at the individual level, and 
seeks to examine the impact of contracting-out of building maintenance services by 
the Western Australian government on the wages of individual workers. This research 
forms part of a larger research project examining the contracting-out of government 
services in Queensland and Western Australia. The process and outcomes of the contracting- 
out of the building maintenance services in Western Australia focuses particularly 
on the maintenance section of the Western Australian Building Management Authority, 
which became part of the Department of Contract and Management Services, 
and then part of Western Properties, which is a section of the Department of Housing 
and Works. The contracting-out of government services in Western Australia was en couraged by 
Domberger et al. (1995b), who acted as a consultant to the Western Australian 
government. Additionally, data concerning the actual efficiency gains and the 
impact on staff wages is available from either primary or secondary sources. The contracting- 
out of Western Australian building maintenance services provides a very useful 
study for examining the contention between Domberger at al. (1995a) and Quiggin 
(1994) on efficiency gains and its sources. 
 
 
In this article, individual informants and companies have been de-identified and 
any commercial in-confidence information has not been divulged. The names of government 
departments, government reports, and most government policies have not 
been obscured as most of this information has already been made freely available by 
the Western Australian government, either on the Internet or in public libraries. 
Individuals responsible for the management of the contracting-out of the maintenance 
services were initially identified and interviewed. “Snowball sampling” was 
used to identify and interview additional individuals who had participated in the contracting- 
out process. People interviewed had participated in multiple levels of the 
process before and after the contracting-out of government services in Western Australia. 
 
Primary qualitative data was gathered by way of semi-structured interviews, 
which were conducted with 15 former government employees who had been employed 
in those areas contracted-out to the private sector, public servants in charge of 
the contracting-out process, and managers of companies that gained contracts from 
government. 
 
Secondary documentation includes both public and private company documents, 
including “Expression of Interest”, “Request for Tender”, tender submissions, contracts, 
as well as published and unpublished government policy documents and reports. 
Employee wage rates were obtained from the WA Industrial Relations Commission, 
and the WA Department of Employment and Consumer Protection. 
 
Data was analyzed through three interrelated phases: coding of primary and secondary 
data in order to determine outcomes for staff; analysis of data and development 
of themes and theoretical development; and the writing up process itself (Funnell 
1996). Analysis followed an iterative process between these three phases. Triangulation 
was used between primary and secondary sources to identify and validate information. 
Where primary sources cannot be validated by triangulation with secondary 
sources, these areas have been noted in the text. 
 
The contracting-out of maintenance services in Western Australia 
In 1993, a Commission established by the West Australian Government, the McCarrey 
Review, argued strongly for increased contracting of government services: 
Most public sector managers do not believe the outmoded public sector management systems 
and the lack of any real authority vested in them by past governments provide any 
encouragement or incentive to improve efficiency or effectiveness (McCarrey 1993a: 
xxxvii). 
 
The objective of introducing widespread competitive tendering in Western Australia 
was argued to “improve the efficiency in government agencies, leading to the same 
level of service at lower costs or improved services at the same cost” (McCarrey 
1993b: 29). In 1993, $AUS1.3 billion of Western Australian government services had already been 
contracted-out. However, the McCarrey Review suggested that much of 
this had occurred in an unstructured manner in the absence of a whole of government 
policy (1993b: 33). Building maintenance was one of the services already contracted 
out in Western Australia, although it was used primarily to address peak periods of 
demand for building maintenance services (Public Sector Management Office 1997). 
 
The McCarrey Review (1993b) identified several issues relating to evaluating the 
performance of the Western Australian Building Management Authority (WAMBA), 
the agency at the time responsible for maintenance of the majority of government 
buildings (Interview 11 2005), including 
• The operations of WABMA were regarded as inefficient by government agencies 
and the private sector; 
• The day labor force was considered about 50% more expensive than private contractors; 
• Part of the workforce did not have sufficient work to keep them gainfully occupied; 
• If the construction and maintenance activities of the BMA were contracted out to 
the private sector, $20 million per annum was predicted to be saved. 
 
The McCarrey Review (1993b: 34) argued that extending the contracting-out arrangements 
of building maintenance in Western Australia would produce an additional 
23.9% of savings to government, and recommended to government that competitive 
tendering be used wherever possible. The potential savings from the competitive tendering 
and contracting of building maintenance services included the following: 
 
 
 
Importantly, it was recommended that all the design, construction and maintenance 
activities carried out by WABMA be contracted out to the private sector with 
WABMA taking on solely an inspection and maintenance scheduling role (McCarrey 
1993b: xxxii). This recommendation amounted to the downsizing of the WABMA 
from 1,400 staff to 400 staff, and disbanding three sections of WABMA: construction, 
design and maintenance sections (Interview 11 2005). Contracting-out of government 
services was argued to produce outcomes of effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery 
(Domberger et al. 1995b: 15). Domberger et al. (1995b: 19) in his study of contracting- 
out across multiple Western Australian governments, reported that there had 
been an average savings of 24.1% between 1993 and 1994. 
 
While accepting that contracting-out tends to reduce budgetary costs Quiggin 
(1994), contends that the majority of budgetary gains from contracting-out of government 
services are as a result of the reduction in wages and increases in work intensity, 
and thus the cost savings are as a result of transfers from staff. The Industry 
Commission (1996: 556), in its major review of a number of cases of the contracting savings was from 
reductions in labor costs. This result was either from increased productivity 
on the part of the private sector, or from reductions in wages costs, with the 
relative importance varying from case to case. 
 
Following the handing down of the McCarrey Review, the then Premier of Western 
Australia, Richard Court, wrote to each of his Ministers, urging them to extend the 
implementation of competitive tendering and contracting-out in their departments 
(Court 1993). A further letter (Court 1994) indicated that competitive tendering and 
contracting-out was a high priority for the government. The letter stated that departmental 
CEO performance appraisals and reporting to parliament were now directly 
tied to the implementation of competitive tendering in each department. Contractingout 
gained impetus in the Western Australian government from that time. WABMA 
responded to the calls for the expansion of contracting-out by Premier Court, by converting 
hundreds of small building maintenance contracts into a few facilities management 
contracts, which would manage the building contractors and day to day facilities 
management activities (Domberger et al.1995b: 23). This model of contracting-out 
went beyond the normal contracting-out of government services, as the facilities management 
arrangements involved the use of third parties who would undertake purchasing 
on behalf of government agencies (State Supply Commission 1996). 
 
In 1995, the Western Australian Building Management Authority engaged consultants 
to develop both a process for managing the contracted maintenance services 
and to screen potential Facility Managers (those in charge of organizing contract 
maintenance) to make sure that they were able to meet the goals of the contractingout 
policies (Public Sector Management Office (WA) et al. 1997). In October 1995, a 
“Request for Proposal” for Metropolitan Buildings was called. This was the first phase 
in the contracting-out of government services and was intended to ensure that there 
was sufficient interest from potential contractors to ensure that market forces could 
be brought to bear on the actual tender process. In other words, the "Request for 
Proposal" was designed to test the marked and ensure that there was sufficient competition 
to result in budgetary savings. 
 
In 1996, the Contract and Management Services (CAMS) was established. CAMS 
was a central contracting service for the public sector in Western Australia (Minson 
1996). This entity took over the previous responsibilities of WABMA in the management 
of building maintenance contracts. CAMS accounted for 2% of total Western 
Australian government expenditure in 1998/1999 (State Supply Commission 2000). 
CAMS was a significant shift for the Western Australian government in disbanding 
WABMA and moving staff to CAMS, ceased to provide building maintenance services 
directly. Maintenance services were purchased from private providers. This shift of 
the function of government department echoes the quote of Osborne and Gaebler 
(1987: 25): “The job of the government is to steer, not to row the boat. Delivering 
services is rowing, and the government is not very good at rowing”. The McCarrey 
Review (1993a/1993b) determined that government was not very good at “rowing”, 
or delivering services, and as a result CAMS was established to manage the service 
contracts. 
 
The intended efficiency outcomes for this process were anticipated in the range 
of 20% (McCarrey Review 1993b: 34), and is in line with previous research findings 
and recommendations of Domberger (1994, 1995a, 1995b). 
 
Industrial relations objectives 
Between 1985 and 1990, approximately two-thirds of all building maintenance and 
breakdown repairs in the Perth metropolitan area were conducted by the “in house” 
labor force. By 1992, significant amounts of work had already been contracted out by 
WABMA. The following graph demonstrates that contracting-out resulted in a significant 
transfer of human capital and expertise from the public sector to the private sector 
(Interview 10 2005)2. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of Labour Force Composition* 
 
*This chart is illustrative only, and is indicative of worker numbers. Actual numbers of 
workers could not be verified from secondary sources. 
 
The Industry Commission (1996) indicated that a “clean break” approach was used by 
some government departments where the government agency made no attempt to 
transfer redundant workforce to the private sector. An alternative is the negotiated 
transfer approach, where the government agency negotiates the transfer of its staff as 
part of the tender process. This is assumed to minimize costs to government, potential 
service disruption due to the contracting-out process, and staff losses (Industry 
Commission 1996: 381). 
 
It is evident from interviews with senior staff involved in the establishment of the 
new agency, CAMS, that there was considerable effort conferring with, and informing 
staff of the process involved in contracting-out maintenance services (Interview 10/ 
Interview 12 2005). The choice of whether to stay employed by government, accept 
redundancy, or move to the FM’s was a voluntary decision by staff (Interview 10 
2005). In effect the Western Australia followed the second approach suggested by the 
Industry Commission (1996) an approach that negotiated on behalf of its staff for 
their transfer to the facilities managers as part of the contracting-out process, although 
the choice of redundancy, redeployment or transfer laid with the individual employee 
(Interview 10 2005). Domberger (1994) argues that in cases similar to Western Australia, 
where guaranteed employment was given to existing staff for the duration of the 
contract, cost-savings could still be achieved. 
 
The Industry Commission (1996) argued that requiring the contractor to maintain 
government wages and conditions should not be mandated, and should be subject to 
negotiation. The Western Australian government went against this recommendation 
and mandated the staff benefits as part of the contracting-out process, although these 
additional costs were built into the contract price. The Request for Proposal (RFP) 
considered the transfer of public sector employees and the protection of their accrued 
benefits (sick leave, holidays, pensions and leave) (Western Australian Building Maintenance 
Authority 1995). The transfer of public sector employees were a criterion in 
the evaluation process, mainly focused around the number of employees to be transferred 
and the protection of their existing benefits (Western Australian Building Maintenance 
Authority 1995). 
 
Most facility managers employed both white collar and blue collar workers (Facility 
Manager 1 1995). Beyond the public sector employees, the proposal did not address 
the recruitment and selection process, and other human resource processes including 
training. On wage conditions, one facility manager indicated they would apply 
the “appropriate award” for each worker (Facility Manager 1 1995). While indicating 
a preparedness to cooperate with unions, there was some reluctance to participate in a 
union “closed-shop” (Facility Manager 1 1995). 
 
Specific wage conditions for employees were not covered in the contracts between 
the government and the facility managers; however clauses concerning the 
transfer of some public sector employees were included (Facility Manager 2 1996). Industrial 
Relations were not significantly addressed in the RFP documents (Public Sector 
Management Office (WA) / State Supply Commission (WA) / Western Australian 
Municipal Association (1997); Western Australian Building Maintenance Authority 
1995). It was evident that attention was given to ensuring existing sick leave benefits 
were preserved for staff. Moreover the employment of former government employees 
was guaranteed with the facility managers for the life of the initial contract (Interview 
10 2005). 
 
Efficiency Outcomes 
In reports that cover the period being examined by this research, all report that costefficiencies 
were achieved by the Western Australian government following the contracting- 
out of maintenance workers, although these were all at the lower levels of expectations 
(Public Sector Management Office 1997, Auditor General of Western Australia 
2001). Initial savings from implementation of contracting-out were around 6.5% 
(McEachran/Ayres 1997), and the Auditor General of Western Australia (2001) found 
a savings of 6%. These are significantly less than the estimated savings from further 
contracting-out of building maintenance services which were estimated at $AUS 23.9 
million, or 35% of total costs by the McCarrey Review (1993a). 
Significantly, these savings were attributed to reduced fees for service provision, 
and reduced expenditure on wages (Public Sector Management Office 1997). Having 
if any, on wages and conditions of employees. 
 
Work condition outcomes 
Following the establishment of CAMS and the contracting-out regime, there were 
several important outcomes for staff. First, after 1991, about a quarter of WABMA 
staff accepted redundancy packages as part of the early efficiency reforms. Within 
CAMS, over half the staff (54%) opted to take redundancy packages, 22% transferred 
to the new facility managers, and 2%, stayed in government. Many who took redundancy 
packages either established their own business and worked for the facility managers, 
or took the opportunity to move into new areas of employment. Most of the 
white collar staff transferred to the facility managers (Interview 14 2005). McEachran 
and Ayres (1997) found that 80% of staff felt that the transfer to the private sector 
was a positive experience. 
 
 
Figure 4: Staff Transfers at Implementation of CAMS 
 
This supports the contention of Domberger (1994) and the findings of the Industry 
Commission (1996) that numbers of public employees can be reassigned, or find work 
with contractors, following contracting-out of government services. 
 
Staff experiences: Skilled Blue Collar Workers who transferred to Facilities 
Managers 
Comparisons of the wages rates of Government and non-Government trade workers 
indicate that government workers received higher pay for the period studied. This pay 
variation is identified in the following table and graph. These diagrams indicate that 
skilled private sector workers in maintenance related trades (such as carpentry, plaster- 
ers, glaziers, drainers and general tradespersons) receive between 97% and 98% of the 
base salary of those covered by government awards. 
 
 
 
Award Pay Rates for Selected Trades 1996 – 20043* 
 
Table 2: Award Pay Rates for Selected Trades 1996 – 2004 
 
 
 
*Wages are based on the wages rates that a worker would receive, regardless of variation in 
duties. Source: Building Trades (Government) Award 1968, No. 31A 2004; Building Trades 
Award 1968, No. 31 2004; Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1996; 
Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1998; Western Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission 2001; Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 2003. 
 
Figure 5: Award Pay Rates for Selected Trades 1996 – 2004 
 
 
 
 
These data are supported by interviews with staff. In addition, it was reported that 
transferring staff found it difficult to determine the comparative wage and benefits of 
the different arrangements: 
“Then the lady, she rattled off some score [wage level], a figure she gave me and off the 
top of my head I think it was … actually $1995 [less than my current wage]” (Interview 6 
2003). 
 
Additionally, opportunities for advancement were reduced under the contracting-out 
period, as well as wages: 
“If I was doing the same job [in WABMA] … my salary would have been better and we 
would have had the opportunity to move to other positions … I was lagging behind in 
incremental wage increases as well” (Interview 4, 2003). 
 
Direct wages were not the only area that was reduced. Indirect benefits such as retirement 
income through superannuation contributions were affected when transferred 
employees found they had a decreased ability to contribute to superannuation 
funds: 
“I would have been better off still being with government financially, from the point of 
view of superannuation and all those things” (Interview 3 2003). 
 
The Western Australian government attempted to preserve the benefits of workers 
when they transferred from the public sector to the private sector (Interview 10 2005). 
The initial private sector arrangement paid employees higher rates than the government 
award (Western Australian Industrial Relations 1996). However, there was potential 
for facility managers to reduce the wages of those who were in their direct employment 
over time, particularly once the initial few years with the guaranteed protection 
of wages and conditions lapsed, with base wages in the private sector consistently 
lower than the public sector. A number of blue collar workers reported a reduction of 
total salary, superannuation, and training opportunities (Interview 3 / Interview 4 / 
Interview 6 2003). 
 
Staff experiences: White Collar Workers who transferred to Facilities Managers 
In contrast to blue collar workers, some of the white collar staff were financially rewarded, 
and experienced career progression as a result of the contracting-out process. 
Three went from junior positions in government into senior positions with the facilities 
managers (Interview 14 2005). These staff believed this improvement in conditions 
resulted from the contracting-out of maintenance services. Some blue collar 
workers were also appointed to administrative positions with the facility managers, before 
returning to traditional trades (Interview 12 2005). 
 
Staff experiences: Unskilled Blue Collar Workers who transferred to Facilities 
Managers 
Another section of the workforce unhappy with the transfer of employment to the 
private sector was trades assistants. These employees did not have trade qualifications 
(Interview 12 2005), however were paid wages close to that of skilled trades people by 
government due to their experience (Interview 10 2005). Following contracting-out, 
many were unable to work at the same level as prior to the contracting-out process 
(Interview 14 2005), as the private contractors or facilities managers were not required 
to pay above the award rates, or to recognize the experience that these workers had 
developed in the public service. These workers lost base wage rates as they were unskilled, 
and the market rates for their services were considerably lower than in government. 
 
Increased work intensity 
There was only an indirect indication of increased work intensity from the contracting- 
out process. A senior staff member who remained in government indicated that 
he was unable to get his former staff to sit down for a cup of tea. "We always used to 
have time for a cup of tea and a chat, but now they all keep saying - we are just too 
busy for that now" (Interview 10 2005). Unfortunately there is no other primary or 
secondary data that can support an increase in work intensity beyond this single quote. 
 
Discussion 
Cost reductions and efficiency gains were well documented by the agencies that controlled 
contracting-out of maintenance services. The Public Sector Management Office 
(1997) analyzed the cost-efficiencies gained from the initial contracting-out process, 
reporting that for metropolitan building maintenance that had been contractedout, 
there was an average savings of around 6.5% for the first 6 months of activity on 
the contracts. The Auditor General of Western Australia (2001) found a savings of 
6% over a 39 month period for metropolitan breakdown services. Areas such as building 
structure maintenance, grounds maintenance and other maintenance services 
showed significant decreases in cost, while there were only minor decreases in costs 
for filament replacement (Public Sector Management Office (WA) et al. 1997). While 
wage reductions were not considered as a source of potential savings in the submissions 
(Facilities Manager 1), the Public Sector Management Office (1997) equates the 
savings achieved to reduced fees charged by the facilities managers, and the reduced 
direct project-related costs charged for the maintenance workers themselves, or reduced 
wages costs. The contracting-out of government maintenance services in Western 
Australia resulted in budgetary savings to government, although these are at a 
lower level than predicted (Domberger 1994; Industry Commission 1996; Rimmer 
1994). Government reports attribute part of these savings to reduced wage costs. 
 
Domberger, et al. (1988: 89) contends that when contracting-out results in wage 
reductions, this should be seen as socially desirable; however Quiggin (1994) argues 
that this is not necessarily a good thing. While government may well be achieving a 
reduction in budget expenditure, this is as a result of a transfer of wages and/or benefits 
from former employees. Employees are being required to pay for decisions of 
government, which means that the contracting-out policy had a negative economic 
impact on employees. While there is a net fiscal gain to government, there is a net 
wages and benefits loss to former employees. 
 
There is no doubt that the contracting-out of maintenance services resulted in 
cost efficiencies of the Western Australian government (Interview 15 2005). However 
this study supports the contention that the contracting-out of government services 
can negatively impact employee wages and benefits (Quiggin 1996) and, training and 
advancement opportunities (Laferty/Roan 2000). The wages and benefits of former 
government employees, transferring to the private sector, had several work conditions 
outcomes. 
 
One interviewee commented on maintaining at least the Government award 
standard pay and benefits. However, this employee conceded that some of those 
benefits were combined into a few, encompassing benefits. For example, travel allow 
ances were cut significantly (Interview 2 2003). A second interviewee rejected a position 
with a facility manager after being offered $2000 less than his/her public service 
salary package (Interview 6 2003). These poorer conditions were evident despite the 
government seeking to maximize the benefits of staff transferring to the facility managers. 
 
Wage case data collected from the Western Australian Industrial Commission for 
blue collar workers indicates that facility managers were able to use lower award wages 
then what would have been used in a government controlled agency (Building Trades 
(Government) Award 1968, No. 31A 2004; Building Trades Award 1968, No. 31 
2004; Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1996; Western Australian 
 
Industrial Relations Commission 1998; Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
2001; Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 2003). This result 
supports the contention of Quiggin (1994) that these savings could be at least partly 
attributed to a reduction in wages of employees. There is also some evidence to suggest 
that unions were being phased out of the enterprise bargaining process, but it is 
unclear if the facility managers controlled this process (Interview 2 2003). Existing 
staff, transferred at the commencement of the new government facility management 
agency, CAMS, were guaranteed existing wages and conditions. However, once these 
original set of contracts expired, there was no longer any guarantee that previous conditions 
would be maintained (Interview 14 2005). Facility managers would eventually 
have the opportunity to reduce wage expenses over time. 
One of the major outcomes that the government was aiming to achieve was the 
protection of benefits gained by public employees in the private sector (Western Australian 
 
Building Maintenance Authority 1995). Where staff were transferred to facility 
managers, none reported a loss of benefits due to the transfer to the private sector 
(Interviews 2/3/4/5/7/9 2003). However, one interviewee reported that benefits 
would be lost if they were made redundant (Interview 4 2003) According to interviewees, 
the transition period was mixed, with some interviewees suggesting the transition 
was fair and amicable (Interviews 1/2/3/7 2003; Interviews 10/13/15 2005), and others 
indicating the system was unfair, difficult or inflexible (Interviews 5/6/8/9 2003). 
Blue collar workers, unskilled workers and poor performing workers were more likely 
to report a negative experience than white collar workers. Employee benefits were 
preserved for the duration of the contract. Senior public service managers maintained 
contact with their former staff, now working in the private sector, to ensure employment 
conditions were being maintained. 
 
Training arrangements were also considered less then adequate by interviewees, 
with at least one reporting not having access to meaningful training in the 8 years of 
employment with a facility manager (Interview 4 2003). This result supports the findings 
of Lafferty and Roan (2000) who suggest that contracted-out workers receive less 
training than their in-house equivalents. There is only very limited support from the 
data (one interview) that increased work intensity was a result of the contracting-out 
process, and this is only by inference. 
 
This study has found that in the case of the contracting-out of maintenance 
workers in Western Australia there has overall been a negative impact on employee 
wages, training and advancement opportunities, and superannuation. Employee leave 
entitlements appear to have been maintained. This research therefore supports the assertion 
of Quiggin (1994, 1996) that a significant source of savings for contracting-out 
would be staff wages and benefits. This result was not universal, and the relative differences 
between white collar and blue collar staff needs further examination. 
 
Differences between white collar and blue collar 
Borland (1994) advanced the hypothesis that where there are a large number of people 
with competence in the delivery of certain services in a market (e.g. carpentry) then 
there is a “thick market” and significant competition for the delivery of services could 
be expected. The competition in the market for unskilled trade’s assistants would be 
presumably even stronger than for skilled trade’s people, which would help to explain 
the pay reductions for these workers. 
 
However, if there are relatively few people able to provide a specific service or 
skill, then there is a “thin market” and relatively little competition could be expected 
(Borland 1994). Under these conditions, there would be little cost savings to government, 
as employees could charge a premium for their services. The Industry Commission 
(1996) supported this notion, arguing that transfer of staff from the public to private 
sectors could be very beneficial for the employees, if there was specific expertise 
lacking in the general marketplace, that government employees happened to possess. 
 
While there is a thick market of carpenters and other trades people in Western 
Australian, the government also contracted-out public servants who had the capability 
of managing state-wide emergency breakdown maintenance services and contracting 
services across large government departments. These people where relatively better 
off following contracting-out, as they had expertise that was lacking amongst facilities 
managers (Interview 10 2005). The Industry Commission (1996) suggested that in 
such situations workers would be able to charge a premium for their expertise as it 
was lacking in the market. 
 
This finding from Western Australia suggests a modification to the theory of 
Quiggin (1994) that contracting-out automatically results in reduced wages and benefits, 
as for some staff in Western Australia the opposite was the case, with increased 
wages and opportunities. Consequently, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Cost savings achieved by government from the contracting-out of services, can 
result in reduction of wages, benefits and conditions for workers when there is an 
abundant supply of these workers (i.e. competition is high) in the labor market. However, 
workers faced with little or no competition in the labor market due to the possession 
of specialized skills, will fare considerably better from the contracting-out process, 
as they are able to extract a premium for their skills. 
 
Conclusions 
While the findings indicate that there was some effort expended in preserving wages 
and conditions of workers who transferred from the public sector to the private sector, 
the translation to the private sector came with some cost for workers. The overall 
package of wages and conditions has been shown to be less than that received in the 
public sector for blue collar workers. Moreover, once installed in the private sector, 
these employees were more vulnerable to the exigencies of private sector employment 
conditions such as poorer redundancy arrangements. Longer term employment considerations, 
such as adequacy of retirement income, were also highlighted as problematic 
for workers who transferred to the private sector in their access to more limited 
superannuation entitlements. The ability of private sector trades and blue collar workers 
to secure adequate career trajectories and career development opportunities including 
training were also more limited in the private sector. However, the immediate 
promotion and advancement opportunities for white collar workers who were able to 
demonstrate special skills not readily available in the market, were more favorable in 
the private sector contracted out arrangements. 
 
This research has tested and found support for the theoretical proposition of 
Quiggin (1994) that the contracting-out of government services can have a negative 
impact on the wages, benefits and conditions of workers. However, this research has 
extended this argument by finding that this outcome is conditional on the relative 
market for the skills of workers in the market place. Where there is strong competition 
for certain skills, due to a “thick market” (Borland 1994), market forces will force 
wages down. However, where there is a lack of specific expertise in a “thin market” 
(Borland 1994), contracting-out of staff will allow wages, conditions and opportunities 
to increase, due to lack of competitive forces in the labor market. 
Future research could examine additional case studies on the actual impact upon 
workers entitlements from the contracting-out process. Such studies would compare a 
range of employee benefits and entitlements, including: wages leave entitlements, 
training and career advancement opportunities, superannuation and work intensity 
across a range of industries, and include a range of worker types. In this way, the theoretical 
findings advanced in this research could be further tested and verified. 
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